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Doctor? Who? Nurses, patient’s best interests and treatment withdrawal. 
When no doctor is available, should nurses withdraw treatment from patients? 
 
 At times where a decision has been made to stop futile treatment of critically ill 
patients on an intensive care unit (ICU) – what is termed withdrawal of treatment in 
the UK - yet no doctor is available to perform the actions of withdrawal, such as 
turning off machines and removing intravenous infusions, nurses may be called upon 
to perform these key tasks. I recently published on the legal and professional position 
of English and Welsh nurses in this situation (Birchley, 2012), and suggested that 
nurses should construct moral justifications for such actions. In this paper I argue that 
any such justification must answer two major questions. One is to ask if it can be in 
patients' best interests for nurses to be the key actors in withdrawal of life sustaining 
treatment. The other is to ask if there is any reason that the nursing profession should 
not undertake such tasks if this is so. Both these questions require the resolution of 
weighty moral and philosophical issues. Thus, while offering a serious attempt to 
provide moral justifications for nurses undertaking withdrawal, this paper also invites 
debate over both the aim of task division between nurses and doctors, as well as how 
we might decide what is in the best interests of patients. 
 Drawing on prudential value theory and Doyal and Gough's (1991a) theory of need, I 
suggest best interests may be understood as the fulfilment of the basic human needs of 
health and autonomy. I offer two justifications for nurses undertaking withdrawal. 
The first suggests that autonomous needs may be fulfilled by a timely death, which, 
by allowing the nearness of family and religious representatives, allows the patient to 
flourish at the end of life. The second justification suggests staff on ICU have 
responsibilities to their patients as a community, which may require that the needs of 
patients are prioritised in order to meet the most urgent needs first. In such an 
environment a co-operative approach to task allocation, that allows those with 
appropriate skills to undertake tasks to which those skills are matched, will ensure that  
need fulfilment is maximised. It is therefore acceptable for nurses to withdraw 
treatment when the intensive care unit is busy and no doctor is available. 
 This paper is about the key tasks involved in withdrawal, rather than the decision 
making process that precedes such tasks. In order to describe these key acts of 
withdrawal of treatment, I shall hereafter use the formulation nurse actioned 
withdrawal (NAW). Before considering the issue in more detail, I should first like to 
clarify some of the circumstances in which NAW takes place. 
 
Case study: Circumstances where NAW takes place 
 
N was critically ill elder with no hope of recovery, and N's family had agreed with the 
healthcare team that treatment no longer served her interests. Dates for withdrawal of 
ventilatory and cardiovascular support were twice agreed between N's family and her 
consultant. On each day the family assembled and said their goodbyes, but unplanned 
emergency admissions increased workplace demands to such an extent that no doctor 
was available to turn off ventilation and remove life sustaining infusions, and the 
planned withdrawal did not take place, visibly adding to the family's stress. When a 
third date was agreed but it became obvious that, for the same reasons, withdrawal 
would not take place again, the bedside nurse suggested to N's family that she might 
be able to undertake withdrawal if this was acceptable to them. With their assent, and 
having sought the agreement of the consultant and nurse in charge, the bedside nurse 
stopped N's ventilator and infusions and N subsequently died. 
 
Review of the legal position of NAW 
 
 In a recent paper (Birchley, 2012) I discussed the legal and professional implications 
of nurses in England and Wales performing NAW. This topic is important because 
withdrawal of treatment is circumstantially similar to killing, and careful legal 
argument has been constructed to avoid criminalising those who undertake it. 
Although nurses had been largely forgotten in these legal arguments, which have been 
tailored to Doctors, nurses potentially derive some legal protection when withdrawing 
treatment on doctors' orders due to English common law recognition that nurses may 
act as doctors’ surrogates. 
 This legal position can be understood in a number of ways: It recognises that the 
reality of much healthcare practice involves teams of doctors and nurses sharing the 
burden of work between them in ways that it would be impractical to demarcate. 
Within such teams the de facto position of nursing is the professional subordinate to 
medicine; no matter how skilled the participants, no matter how democratic the 
process, a doctor will be in charge and own the key decisions. While potentially 
protective, this legal position could be perceived as devaluing the role of nurses, 
characterising their activities as servile to the will of doctors. Indeed the legal position 
seems to clash with the more aspirational language of the Nursing and Midwifery 
council's professional code, with their view of collegiate professional teamworking 
creating a strong disjuncture with the legal position, opening the door to nurses who 
are legally exonerated facing professional censure. 
 In the face of this confusion and misrepresentation there are a number of reasons 
nurses who undertake NAW should find moral arguments for their actions. Firstly, a 
rationally argued moral standpoint will provide nurses the firm philosophical ground 
from which to agitate for changes in both the law and professional standards. 
Furthermore, professional regulators have no professed desire to punish nurses for 
properly conducted nursing, and moral argument may offer a defence for a nurse 
called upon to justify their activities by the Nursing and Midwifery Council. Finally, 
although common law is untested on this point, any weaknesses of the legal argument 
may be bulwarked by ethical reasoning because, despite the separation of law and 
morality in a system of positive law, judges will recourse to ethical arguments when 
the law reaches its limits (Waldron, 2009; Huxtable, 2007). 
 
Should nurses undertake NAW? 
 
 Any justification of NAW must answer two questions, both of which have 
repercussions upon wider nursing and healthcare practice. The first is to ask if NAW 
can be in patients' best interests. As the measurement of best interests raises questions 
of considerable complexity in itself, I shall consider this in a moment. The second, 
smaller, question is to ask, if NAW is in the best interests of patients, is there any 
reason nurses as a profession ought not to do it? It is to this question I shall turn. 
 
Why not nurses? 
 
 Arguments suggesting nurses should not undertake NAW suggest something 
distinctive about the role of a nurse that prohibits her from being involved in the 
withdrawal process.
1
 Because any examination of nursing practice reveals many 
complex and highly technical tasks undertaken by nurses, arguments that nurses are 
too unskilled to undertake technical tasks are not worthy of lengthy response. 
However, a similar argument worth considering suggests there is something within 
the essence of nursing that is anathema to NAW. Such a viewpoint is reinforced by 
phrases such as “nursing care only” that are frequently used to describe the status of 
patients for whom active medical treatment is no longer being pursued, implying a 
clear demarcation of the duties of the nurse and the doctor. At the heart of such 
arguments are questions of the identity and status of nursing. For instance, 
considering potential nurse involvement in euthanasia, McCabe (2007) suggests that 
the basic values of nursing are to care for and foster life and as such are incompatible 
with actions that precipitate death, even when healing and life are not possible. But, 
given that withdrawal is meant to alleviate futile suffering, where there is no hope of 
healing or recovery, it is difficult to use such arguments against NAW, and indeed, 
McCabe is careful not to direct her criticisms at withdrawal of treatment, as it might 
facilitate a good death, which she argues is also a function of healing. 
 A different objection is that we should distinguish nursing activities from those of 
doctors in order to preserve the interests of the nurse. Such a strategy would, for 
instance, not prevent a bedside nurse from emphasising the urgency of enacting the 
withdrawal upon medical colleagues, while still considering the task incumbent upon 
that profession and thus not exposing the nurse to accusations that she had 
overstepped legal or professional boundaries by undertaking NAW. Yet arguments 
that displace patients from their central position in nursing activities, perhaps to serve 
bureaucratic or legal expedience, seem morally problematic. Consider the position 
espoused by Pohlman (1990), who advises nurses to tolerate patient's pain rather than 
expose themselves to legal action by administering painkillers that may inadvertently 
hasten a patient's death. Such a position falls far short of a satisfactory response to a 
real dilemma.
2
 While discouraging nurses from exposing themselves to legal censure 
                                                 
1
 An argument not examined here is that, because death is so important, and “killing” so 
abhorrent, it is socially important that only a small, trusted elite within society should be allowed to 
conduct withdrawal, and therefore it is a satisfactory if this trusted elite is limited to doctors. I have no 
space to pursue this line of thinking, but acknowledge, while by no means an insurmountable 
argument, it may represent a rich vein of inquiry. 
2
 Although note that my discussion of the legal aspects of NAW may clarify the law in this 
situation as well. See: Birchley (2012). 
is morally defensible, surely a full response would visit the legal and professional root 
of such dilemmas and actively work toward solutions rather than tolerating a status 
quo that results in human suffering. 
 Ultimately the reasons nurses do some things and not others is obscure, and probably 
sociological, rather than moral, in origin. Chiarella (2002) argues plausibly that it is 
founded upon the technical status of tasks, professional protectionism and nurses' 
position as ancillary to doctors. The hugely varied nature of what nurses actually do 
seems to reinforce this position; for instance nurses undertake high-level executive 
functions in healthcare organisations (Perra, 2001), cover medical rosters in primary 
care (Horrocks et al., 2002) as well as delivering a huge variety of face to face care to 
patients. If arguments against NAW are sociological, rather than moral, then I suggest 
there is no clear barrier to NAW provided we address any latent professional or legal 
risks. 
 
Needs and the best interests of patients 
 
 Having offered an answer to our smaller question, it now falls to me to answer the 
more complex question of how NAW serves patients' best interests. In the case study, 
I suggest NAW is attempting to do this. Yet although frequently employed as an 
explanation in itself, patients' best interests are neither transparent nor provable, 
leading some commentators (Lyons, 2010; Harrington, 2003) to identify the best 
interest standard as a rhetorical device. Others have criticised it as epistemologically 
unprovable, as well as incomprehensible given the multiplicity of possible outcomes 
to any given situation (Baines, 2008). For this reason I believe a justification of NAW 
on the basis of best interests must go further and explain how it serves them. In 
competent patients this is relatively simple if we agree the widely accepted formula 
that patients' autonomous wishes are the best possible expressions of their interests, 
provided these wishes are both fully informed and considered (Beauchamp and 
Childress, 1994a; Harris, 1995). However, for many patients, the professional identity 
of the person taking key actions in withdrawal will not be the subject of strong 
preference provided that person is sensitive and competent. In such an ambivalent 
situation we require a more developed explanation.  More pressingly we must also 
consider that prior to withdrawal many patients are not competent to state their wishes 
on this matter due to critical illness, and it is these patients in particular who form a 
difficult subgroup when it comes to determination of their interests in general. Absent 
the patient’s own opinions, we try to determine what a detached observer would agree 
was in the patient’s best interests. But what of the patients prior or assumed opinions? 
Although embraced by the some legal systems as a method for navigating around this 
problem, I suggest now that using proxy judgements is not entirely satisfactory. 
 
The problem with proxy judgement 
 
 I do not dispute the very powerful argument that, provided I am both in possession 
of, and capable of processing, all essential information pertaining to my interests, It is 
I who should determine where my best interests lie, based on my own understanding 
of the world and my place within it. Such an understanding is satisfactory because 
what I determine is best for me may not be what somebody else determines is best for 
them despite an outwardly identical situation; deciding my interests is a matter for my 
subjective opinion. Thus two patients, both faced with the same terminal illness, when 
offered treatment that is arduous but may extend their life by a few months, might 
justifiably choose opposite options based upon their subjective understanding of their 
interests. Such an argument is a convincing basis for rejecting paternalism in 
healthcare and recognising that the (informed) patient knows best, and is relatively 
uncontroversial. Yet holding that what is best for patients is based on their subjective 
preference creates problems when a patient is unable to express their interests because 
of critical illness. Although this is answered in UK and US law by using proxy 
judgement, this risks substituting the subjective opinion of another for that of the 
patient. Such arguments are not new (Harris, 2003; Wrigley, 2007) and I do not wish 
to waste too many words remaking them, but it is worth reviewing them briefly.  
 In proxy judgements a third party, using their knowledge of the patient, makes a 
decision on behalf of the patient. There are two methods of proxy judgement and both 
are problematic. In a substituted judgement a third party makes a proxy decision on 
the basis of what a rational person would want in such a situation. This is 
unsatisfactory because the proxy decision maker’s idea of a reasonable decision may 
not be the patient’s. Not only is the notion of what is reasonable unclear3 but the very 
nature of patient autonomy is that it empowers a patient to act unreasonably if they so 
wish.
4
 In a surrogate judgement a third party surmises the patient’s decision by using 
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 For instance, following the tradition of Hobbes we might see reason as self interest, whereas to 
followers of John Stuart Mill it might represent an acceptance of pluralism. 
4
 One could of course argue that incompetent patients forfeit the right to have a say in their 
treatment, for instance because autonomous decision making is a right to be claimed. This seems to 
treat human beings unequally dependening on their competence and I therefore do not consider it here. 
the antecedent decisions and wishes of the patient. But while the opinions of a close 
relative may give a reasonable guess of the patient’s wishes, we should be careful to 
note that relatives often make incorrect guesses of their loved ones wishes – a 
systematic review of the accuracy of surrogate judgements suggested relatives 
wrongly guessed their loved one’s wishes in a third of cases (Shalowitz et al., 2006). 
This is not surprising because, while the known opinions of the patient may be 
considered by the surrogate, the patient might not have discussed the nuances of their 
current situation; indeed, given the effect that our actual experiences have on our 
opinions and the often unprecedented nature of critical illness in a patient’s life, it is 
likely that patients themselves will have little prior idea of their response in such 
circumstances. The surrogate is therefore left to guess the patient’s likely decision, 
and has little option but to inform this guesswork with their own subjective opinion. 
Clearly simple substitution of one subjective opinion for another is a corruption of the 
principle of autonomy that surrogate decision making seeks to protect. I suggest we 
need to take a different tack and turn away from flawed attempts to reconstruct the 
complex and highly subjective opinions of individual autonomy - although a more 
simplistic notion of autonomy will ultimately be retained. Instead we should devise a 
more objective method of determining best interests
5
. I shall argue now that such a 
method may offer a valuable line of inquiry, but that we can never entirely escape 
some notion of autonomy. 
 Using need to inform objective best interests 
DeGrazia (1995) suggests that determinations of best interests often overlook the 
potential of prudential value theory, the study of what makes up an individual’s 
ultimate (nonmoral) wellbeing. Within this area of philosophical theory, objective list 
accounts suggest we may be able to capture wellbeing within an objective list of states 
of affairs that are independent of both pleasure and desire. An objective list is 
attractive as the unconscious, terminally ill patient has no current experiences or 
complex desires and no hope of recovery to provide them with future experiences on 
which to base their future welfare (Crisp, 2008). Yet, while objective list approaches 
may offer us a way to quantify best interests (and indeed have been employed lately 
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 A caveat: objectivity may be attractive, but has something of an end-of -the-rainbow quality. I 
seek to find a workable objectivity, rather than an evasive “view from nowhere”. In doing so I have not 
considered in any depth attempts to reach such a practical objectivity through intersubjective agreement 
(such as those proposed by e.g. Daniels, 1979). Inasmuch as this may support the idea that we could 
find an objective position simply by sampling the opinions of the clinical team and the patients’ 
advocate - which is arguably the position of the Mental Capacity Act (2005) - I suggest sampling 
opinions from these few individuals does not approximate objectivity. 
in the courts to decide the best interests of children; Birchley, 2010) the content of 
such lists is contentious, with proposed items, including health, autonomy and deep 
personal relationships, largely included on the intuitions of the thinker (DeGrazia, 
1995). In considering what we might plausibly include in such a list, a more robust 
approach may be to seek a developed account from within the literature. One 
psychological account, Maslow's Hierarchy of Human Need (1943) contains five 
broad categories of human needs, arranged in a pyramid, each of which he suggests 
requires fulfilment before the next. While established and familiar to many, there is 
little evidence for needs to be organised in such a complex hierarchical form (Wahba 
and Bridwell, 1976), and Maslow's mixture of objective and subjective needs may be 
problematic for populating an objective list. Another thoroughly argued position is 
that of Doyal and Gough in their seminal work A Theory of Human Need (1991a). 
There are several reasons why this theory is more attractive than Maslow's. There is a 
cross-disciplinary background to the researchers, and Doyal's medical ethics 
background may help the application of this theory to specific healthcare based 
scenarios. The theory is explicitly founded upon an identification of objective needs, 
and therefore suits the creation of an objective list better than Maslow's mixture of 
subjective and objective needs. Finally, while Doyal and Gough identify eleven 
intermediate needs, they found these upon just two basic needs, and plainly the 
smaller the number of items within an objective list, the easier their inclusion is to 
defend.  I acknowledge that a number of accounts of need exist and it is possible a 
better model exists than Doyal and Gough’s. Yet I suggest Doyal and Gough's 
account of needs is practically indistinguishable from approaches that attempt to 
quantify human wellbeing within objective lists, and it is a valid and defensible source 
from which to draw. In doing so I am ready to advance a detailed claim: NAW can 
satisfy patient need, and by satisfying needs, it serves patients' interests. To proceed I 
shall consider the two basic needs identified by Doyal and Gough (1991b), health and 
autonomy, and how these may offer us a justification of NAW. 
 
Is autonomy an objective need? 
 
 It is significant that, although they name eleven intermediate needs, Doyal and 
Gough (1991b) consider that there are only two basic needs, and it is upon these I 
wish to focus: health, as it facilitates much of human action, and autonomy, because 
without the ability to freely choose our own aims and goals we cannot connect our 
reasons to our actions. I suggest it is worthy of some comment that autonomy, through 
which we express our preferences, is considered an objective human need because 
notions of autonomy, while representing a concept that can be used objectively, also 
appears to demand a subjective input from the patient as well. This is important 
because the patient population for whom we have determined an objective list 
approach is needed is largely unable to provide this subjective input, and I have 
already suggested we must avoid proxy decision making as it risks substituting a 
proxy’s subjective account of interests for the patient’s. Only by separating the 
subjective and objective strands of autonomy can it feasibly inform an objective 
account of best interests. To do this, let us consider the nature autonomy. 
 While I acknowledge there are complex psychosocial elements of health, for my 
argument it is a more simplistic, medically modelled measure that I consider here. In 
this way, by objective measures such as cardiovascular stability and respiratory 
sufficiency, health is easy to define. Meanwhile, autonomy has a multitude of 
meanings; for instance autonomy has been variously proposed to be based on rights 
(Baggini and Fosl, 2007a),
 
on trust (Stirrat and Gill, 2005) and on social relationships 
(Verkerk, 1999). Doyal and Gough (1991b) define autonomy as the way an individual 
facilitates action, but this seems to require more explanation. For autonomy does more 
than just facilitate action but governs the internal, subjective elements of personal 
choice that govern individual actions and responses as well. Thus I suggest autonomy 
has both elements that can be fulfilled objectively by providing for our needs, but also 
subjective elements that govern individual choices. Any account of objective best 
interests must begin by taking account of the relationship between these elements, in 
order to be sure that it only includes the objective elements (in other words the 
elements that can be provided externally) and is thus fit for purpose. A satisfactory 
account is nevertheless tricky, as the boundary between these subjective and objective 
elements is fuzzy. Thus my autonomy may be impinged from an objective point of 
view if I am constrained from choosing by imprisonment or illness, however the 
choice I am exercising is itself a subjective choice, governed by my free will and 
personal decisions. These elements of subjective and objective autonomy are not 
divisible, as one means nothing without the other: If I drink but do not choose to, I 
lack autonomy. If I choose to drink but am restrained from drinking, I have, it is true, 
chosen, but I have not facilitated the action of drinking, so also lack autonomy. Only 
by the choosing and the doing am I exhibiting autonomy. 
 Given this subjective aspect, how is it possible that autonomy is an objective need?  
Doyal and Gough (1991b) suggest it is because autonomy gives value to human 
existence, so that while autonomy flows from health, health only has a value if we can 
exercise this autonomy, this freedom to choose and do. Our population of patients, 
deeply sedated and critically ill, clearly lack the ability to do - their autonomy is 
diminished - but what of the freedom to choose? If in some way the manner of their 
death can imply a choice, then NAW can indeed be justified by appeals to autonomy. 
I now argue that, at least within this narrow context, these expressions of autonomy 
can be defined as those that add value to human life, and death. 
 
Autonomy, death and Flourishing 
 
 I have concluded above that autonomy can be understood as a basic, objective need, 
no less vital than health itself to our humanity. Autonomy facilitates action, but I have 
proposed that this action is deeply bound up with the choice it expresses. In our 
deeply sedated, critically ill patients, who have no future but to die, action is 
impossible and choice is constrained severely. For this reason, I suggest autonomy at 
the end of life relates particularly to self expression, and in NAW by the choice of the 
circumstances of one’s death. Self expression at the time of death contains significant 
unquantifiable elements; dying must encompass more than the facts surrounding a 
death, but also more qualitative elements such as how we die. Virtue ethicists have 
adopted the Aristotelian term that encompasses the goals of a fulfilled life, 
eudaemonia (Baggini and Fosl, 2007b), and I suggest that we can use this term, 
usually translated as flourishing, as it seems to encompass the significant but 
immeasurable qualitative variables that we must respect when we consider human 
existence. I suggest that it is possible to respond to patients basic, autonomous needs 
at the end of life by allowing flourishing. The timing of death is a key circumstance 
and a self expressive concern, at least where it is or was material to the patient or their 
family. This will very possibly be the case, as families are usually keen to be with a 
relative when they die and timing will also affect the satisfaction of religious 
observations at and around the time of death (Fridh et al., 2007), so it seems 
defensible to claim that legitimate autonomous needs are impinged if timing of death 
is haphazard. 
 Timing of death may become haphazard if taking the key actions in withdrawal of 
treatment is dependent upon the availability of a doctor. In most cases withdrawal of 
treatment takes place in ICU, where there may be very high levels of patient demand 
and relatively fewer doctors available compared to nurses due to the numbers rostered 
on any particular shift. Given the importance of meeting autonomous needs that will 
be affected by the timing of death, such as presence of relatives or religious 
representatives, I suggest that NAW may be justified on the basis of upholding 
patients' best interests, specifically their need for autonomy. 
 
A further justification of NAW 
 
 I have argued that NAW may be justified on the basis of autonomy. I wish to 
consider if there is a second justification for NAW. One argument, that to wait for a 
doctor would increase the burden of suffering upon the patient, seems to fail, as we 
must believe suffering is being minimised through the judicious use of medication in 
order to countenance waiting for religious and familial concerns to be satisfied.  I 
would like instead to consider if we can reframe the way we approach patient need, 
based upon a communitarian standpoint and accounting for the critical needs of the 
patients on ICU as a whole. In the following section I argue that, as healthcare 
professionals have different sets of skills, there is an obligation for them to take a 
communitarian approach to task allocation, and such an approach may entail nurses 
taking on roles, such as NAW, for which they are appropriately skilled, in order that 
others with different skill sets may fulfil the urgent needs of other patients. Such an 
argument presents some necessary limits to autonomy in healthcare. I also suggest it 
presents a strong argument for allowing NAW. 
 
A place for Communitarianism in ICU 
 
 Following Doyal and Gough (1991a), I have agreed that the basic needs of persons 
consist of health and autonomy, and suggested that the need to flourish at the end of 
life may be served by the timeliness of death, facilitated by NAW. In this section, I 
suggest a second justification of NAW based on a communitarian approach to 
fulfilling health needs on the ICU. I argue that need fulfilment extends to the overall 
needs of the patients on the ICU. Naturally this may bring the needs of autonomy and 
health into conflict, and in such cases, we must prioritise urgent health needs over 
autonomy, meaning, in critical situations, that individual autonomy must temporarily 
yield to the urgent health needs of others as long as this critical situation lasts. This 
impacts upon withdrawal because, as I have proposed circumstances of death are a 
function of autonomy, and timing of death may be a key circumstance, timely 
withdrawal for one patient is an autonomous need that may be over-ridden by the 
more urgent health needs of others. One practical method of both ameliorating the 
effects of this and maximising the fulfilment of need (and thus the best interests of 
patients) is by healthcare practitioners disregarding a demarcation of tasks based on 
tribalistic interprofessional boundaries and focusing their skills upon the tasks to 
which they are most suited. Where critical health needs exist that require the special 
skills of doctors, it is justifiable that appropriately skilled nurses undertake NAW as 
such actions enable maximisation of need fulfilment. 
 Displacing, even temporarily, individual autonomy from its primary place in 
healthcare ethics is controversial and requires at least an explanation, if not a 
fundamental reappraisal of the healthcare environment.
6
 To commence this I shall 
begin by introducing key communitarian ideas, before applying their critique to the 
status of the communal and the personal in contemporary healthcare ethics. 
 
MacIntyre, Communitarianism and Autonomy 
 
 In a key work of communitarian ethics,
7
 MacIntyre argues we must re-engage with 
Aristotelian thinking (MacIntyre, 2007). Of particular importance is the suggestion, 
bound to the concept of telos (often translated as 'purpose in life'), that a good life is a 
journey that travels through the correct places rather than to a point of personal 
enlightenment, a journey that encompasses both the person and the society to which 
they belong. MacIntyre (2007) criticises the dominant ethical schema for elevating 
personal and private morality above the broader society in which humans function 
(Bell, 2009). Such schemas are nowhere more dominant within healthcare, where 
ethics is dominated by the four principles approach, wherein autonomy has gained an 
importance above the other principles that govern it (Gillon, 2003) and upholding 
autonomy is the paramount consideration. I shall term this the pro-autonomy 
viewpoint. If, as its adherents accept (Beauchamp and Childress, 1994a; Gillon, 
2003), the principle of autonomy primarily concerns itself with individual rights (not 
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 Although arguable, I suggest there is widespread evidence for the primacy of autonomy within 
healthcare. In a moment I suggest that commentators such as Gillon have explicitly argued that 
autonomy is the most important ethical principle within healthcare. Similarly, sociological 
examinations of healthcare note the widespread institutional acceptance of autonomy is the ‘success 
story’ of medical ethics (Zussman, 1997). Moreover, the UK experience of the use of patient choice as 
a tool for raising healthcare quality has been the mantra of successive governments that amounts to a 
consensus among the political class. While it is sensible to maintain that there are defacto limits to 
autonomy (and my argument could be considered to defend such a position) I would also suggest that 
limits to autonomy due to resource scarcity and have largely been ignored or at least (in the case of the 
UK’s National Institute Clinical Excellence) widely disparaged in favour more politically expedient 
approaches to public policy. Similarly the US legal system explicitly places autonomy at the heart of 
controversial healthcare decisions about patients, see e.g. Griffith (1991). 
7
 “After Virtue” has been described by others as communitarian, rather than by its Author, who 
essentially rooted it within Virtue Ethics. 
only the right to refuse treatment, but also with rights to direct and control one's 
treatment), it is appropriate to ask if such an approach will maximise the meeting of 
need within the confines of an ICU. I suggest that the elevation of autonomy ignores 
the communal nature of healthcare, because practitioners are practically, morally (and 
legally) responsible for the needs of all of their patients. In this environment, effective 
prioritisation is needed, and an urgent need must yield to a less urgent need. While 
this may be a defacto situation in healthcare due to limitations on resources, my 
suggestion is that it can be explained using something other than an appeal to social 
justice or a rejection of ethics for expediency, by appealing to the nature of need 
itself. I suggest a critical health need may at times be more urgent than an autonomous 
need, and therefore, sometimes autonomy must yield to the satisfaction of the health 
needs of others. This notwithstanding autonomy is important and requires a robust 
defence. We can do this by re-examining its value within the special context of 
healthcare environments. 
 
The special nature of the healthcare environment 
 
 A pro-autonomy approach, places the autonomous individual at the centre of any 
schema and looks for justifications to flow from them (Gillon, 2004). This is because 
such an approach tends to rightly concern itself with the legal and political rights of 
citizens in mainstream society. But the healthcare environment differs considerably 
from normal day to day participation in society; patients are often weak and unable to 
participate fully or at all in decisions, and these decisions encompass a complex body 
of knowledge they may not fully appreciate. The aims of healthcare are similarly 
unusual, as they are both nurturing and, importantly, impossible to achieve without a 
co-operation between the patient (and often their family) and the healthcare team. 
Given this, highly unusual, co-operative environment, we must ask if a pro-autonomy 
approach is always appropriate as a justification of the activities of healthcare 
professionals. I suggest that a wholesale importation of the pro-autonomy approach to 
autonomy is as a result of a misconception of the purposes of healthcare as an 
individualistic and conflict driven arena, yet healthcare is anything but individualistic 
and involves nurses and doctors of varying skill levels working in close proximity to 
one another toward a common goal; the meeting of the needs of their patients. In 
order to meet these needs, it is sometimes necessary to prioritise the needs of different 
patients depending on their urgency, and this will entail setting aside the needs of one 
patient in favour of another. I suggest this is justifiable because the urgent need for 
health outweights the need for autonomy. 
 
Why the need for health can trump the need for autonomy 
 
 As I discussed earlier, autonomy seems potentially problematic as an item on an 
objective list of needs, because it contains strong subjective elements. However it 
earns a place on a list of objective needs due to the value it gives to human existence, 
and it is this addition of value that strongly binds it to health, for without autonomy, 
health itself has a much reduced value. We can see from this that the ability to satisfy 
the patient’s subjective understanding of their need in itself forms an important part of 
basic, objective, human need. However, I suggest the purely objective elements of 
need are more urgent because without health, autonomy can never be achieved. In 
satisfying the best interests of a patient population, satisfaction of critical health needs 
must therefore take precedence over satisfaction of needs of autonomy. Such a 
ranking of needs has broad acceptability among theorists; Doyal and Gough speak of 
need being satisfied either critically or optimally (1994a), while Wiggins and Dermen 
(1987) use identical concepts to separate instrumental from categorical needs. 
Nevertheless, as the satisfaction of autonomy contains vital protection for the 
individual, it remains valuable. In a moment I must clarify how we should express this 
value in the healthcare environment. But first I must offer arguments against the 
strength of my claim that urgent health needs might trump autonomy. 
 
Why this argument does not defeat the claim that NAW can be in patient’s best 
interests 
 
The claim that vital health needs can override autonomous needs when they compete 
requires some finessing, as it potentially defeats the claim that NAW is in the 
patient’s best interests. One defeating argument says that if urgent health needs trump 
autonomous needs, then when a patient wants their treatment withdrawn we should 
override the patients’ wishes at the time of death because they compete with a more 
urgent health need; that of keeping them alive as long as we might. 
A second argument claims that, if health trumps autonomy, then I am automatically 
better off if I am locked in a prison cell all my life, but kept in perfect health. 
 I have two objections to these arguments. In the first instance I suggest such actions  
as keeping a person alive as long as possible would not really serve the needs of 
health if health was unattainable; however, this argument might be effective against 
patient requests for euthanasia in healthy individuals, or where their health could be 
maintained for some time; importantly it does seem to allow that we might be better 
off healthy and in a prison cell. To counter this, my second objection is that such 
arguments misunderstand the nature of need as I have proposed it. To preserve health 
in a non-urgent context at the perpetual cost of autonomy does not recognise the 
intimate binding of both health and autonomy that we must accept if they are both 
basic needs. Health is a critical need because only with health is autonomy possible, 
yet to pursue health in order to purposely override autonomy does not recognise the 
fundamental importance of autonomy to being human. There is of course a time 
critical element where health must be the priority as it is an urgent need which, if not 
satisfied, will curtail autonomy irrevocably. Yet, in a non-urgent clinical situation, it 
is ultimately for the patient to define their non-critical health needs. 
 
The nature of Autonomy in a healthcare environment 
 
I suggested a moment ago that autonomy may have a particular value in the healthcare 
environment. It is important to clarify this because of the potentially dangerous and 
radical assault on the individual that overriding autonomous needs can constitute, as 
satisfying autonomy can offer vital protections against tyranny. It is this repudiation 
of autonomy which has been most central to criticism of communitarianism; for, it is 
argued, without satisfying autonomy the needs of the individual are liable to be 
crushed by greater needs of society at large (Beauchamp and Childress, 1994b) - 
indeed there is a long and depressing history throughout the world of individual 
oppression being justified on behalf of the 'common good' (Baggini and Fosl, 2007c). 
This is a valid criticism and when self sacrifice is demanded of individual members of 
society in the name of the greater good, I suggest it is not truly in the common interest 
if it disproportionately affects one section of society.
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 But to a great extent this is 
beside the point; autonomy in healthcare seems to be far removed from the crushing 
wheels of society, and it has long been problematic to apply principles of autonomy 
and self direction to one of the most dependent population of all, the sick. For 
example, legal cases where very sick people have refused treatment have questioned 
the ability of the ill to make balanced judgements (Brazier and Bridge, 1996), and 
these continue to excite considerable legal and philosophical debate (MacLean, 2008). 
                                                 
8
 I suggest this may be a central difference between utilitarianism and communitarianism, as the 
atomistic nature of utilitarian benefits imply the legitimate sacrifice of the few for the many whereas 
communitarianism suggests a communal benefit that could measure the detrimental societal effect of 
such “population sacrifice”. It is beyond the scope of this paper to argue such a point more thoroughly. 
Further, the concept of autonomy seems to have become far removed from the 
theories of its founding father JS Mill, whose political background concerned him 
with the right of an individual to live life without the violent oppression of the 
majority (Wilson, 2007). Unfortunately the concept of autonomy has become elevated 
to such an extent that even the unbidden plucking of an eyelash or the taking of a 
harmless mouth swab (Archard, 2008) are seen by contemporary ethicists as major 
assaults upon individual autonomy. Yet if we take the concept of autonomy back to its 
Millian roots, I suggest there is no reason that it cannot be accommodated within a 
communitarian framework. As Beauchamp and Childress (1994b) concede, it is very 
much a false dichotomy to suggest that the needs of the community and the needs of 
the individual are opposed to so great a degree that we must always choose one or the 
other. In his communitarian analysis of East Asian societies, Bell (2006) argues that 
those cultures do not assign scant value individual rights, but rather give them less 
priority than other communal concerns in cases where the two conflict. Applying such 
reasoning to ICU, it is entirely legitimate that we support autonomous needs of 
individuals while there is a clear and unconflicted benefit for the population as a 
whole that we do so, because autonomy is a basic human need. However, where the 
autonomous needs of one individual conflict with the urgent health needs of another, 
these health needs must be satisfied first. 
 
NAW maximises need fulfilment in ICU 
 
 To justify NAW, I have already made an argument that the circumstances of death 
are an autonomous need because they are self expressive and contribute to individual 
flourishing. As I have described above, this autonomous need may be set aside if  
staff are busy meeting specific urgent health needs of other patients. If this is the case 
NAW seems desirable as withdrawal of treatment requires no specifically medical 
skills, and the greater number of nurses than doctors on duty means that a nurse is 
more likely than a doctor to be available. Healthcare is a co-operative environment 
where healthcare professionals work together to meet the needs of patients. Nurses 
and doctors, in particular, work closely together, and although their skills overlap, 
there is both demarcation of labour and a subdivision of focus. Simplistically 
explained this division means that doctors focus upon management of particular 
technical health interventions within a caseload, while nurses take care of the 
remaining patient needs, ensuring that not only health needs but autonomous needs 
are met. If medical staff have particular skills, built around high intervention 
therapies, by which to promote health in patients, and those skills are in short supply 
due to small numbers of doctors working on any shift, it makes no sense to demarcate 
a task to them that is well within the skill set of nurses. Ensuring the appropriate task 
is undertaken by the appropriate individual is not a hierarchical division between the 
noble and the vile, but a division based on co-operation, because only with this co-
operation between one healthcare professional and another, can the common goal of 
meeting the needs of patients be achieved, and the common good be served. In such 
an environment, the allocation of one professional to a task to which they are 
appropriately skilled, if it allows another to undertake a task another professional 
cannot, is an active good as it maximises benefits to patients. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 There is now increasing recognition that needs at the time of death are hugely 
important to patients and their families (Steinhauser et al., 2001; Fridh et al., 2007). 
Historically, the pre-eminence of medical paternalism meant that this importance was 
set aside in the belief that death was too ugly and distressing to be witnessed by 
families or acknowledged by patients. Yet it is now widely accepted that outcomes in 
line with the patient’s wishes are an acceptable yardstick of excellence, and may 
sometimes contradict received medical wisdom. It is this complex inter-relationship 
between the health needs and the autonomous needs of the patient that I have tried to 
bare in my discussion of need, for if we can capture something of the essence of 
human need, we can begin to rationalise the actions of those working to fulfil the best 
interests of patients in the demanding environment of the ICU. As I argue above, a 
model of ethics that places patient autonomy at the centre of this environment fails as 
an explanation. Patient autonomy is vitally important, forming a key part of what 
allows us to be human, but this autonomy is intimately bound to health, and is 
valueless without it, for the freedom to formulate action without the ability to exercise 
it is, to all practical extents, the same as a denial of that freedom. Healthcare 
professionals on the ICU have a duty to not one, but all the patients in their care, and 
in such an environment the vital needs of autonomy and health are sometimes thrown 
into competition; the fact that health is the precursor of autonomy means that in such 
a situation, the meeting of urgent health needs must be a priority. The varying skills of 
ICU professionals mean this thwarting of autonomous needs can be ameliorated if 
NAW takes place. The fact that healthcare is a co-operative environment based on a 
common aim – to satisfy the best interests of patients – also means that this overruling 
of autonomous needs for the sake of the common good is less critical than in 
mainstream society. Despite this there must a commitment to autonomy and by 
bringing the skills of all practitioners to bear, rather than narrowly demarcating 
professional roles, we can  optimise the satisfaction of both of these needs. 
 Upholding the best interests of patients must be the central role of the healthcare 
professions. The circumstances of a patient’s death are a vital part of these interests 
and it is unacceptable that patients and their families may endure hours or days of 
waiting for a doctor to become available.  I have concluded there are sound moral 
arguments for nurses to take an active role in planned withdrawal of treatment. By 
clearly identifying the benefits for patients, practitioners can defend their practice 
from narrow or bureaucratic demarcation of roles that is detrimental to practice and 
morally unsustainable. 
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